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THE ORGANISATION OF A MODERN FLEET 
FOR WAR; CONDUCT IN ACTION, ETC., ETC 
FORJIER PAPERS (1872,1880, & 1887) BROUGHT U P  TO DATE. 
By Rear-Admiral Sir CIIARLES C.4UPBBLL1 K.C.U.G., C.B., D.S.O. 
Thursday, 24th Nay, 1906. 
Admiral Sir ~ T A T I ~ A X I E L ’  BOWDES-SMITH; K.C.B., in the Chair. 
INTRODUCTION. . 
T H E  1872 paper was written in competition for the prize offered 
by the  Junior Professional Association, and is quoted to-day as evi- 
dence tha t  five-and-thirty years ago I \.vas a strong advocate f o r  
fitting the fleet-ship with a means of defence against torpedoes, sup- 
plying her with ausiliary torpedo-boats and a tender in which nothing 
but speed, turning power, and torpedo fittings have been considered, 
etc.” 
The 1880 paper mas written in competition for the R.U.S.I. Gold 
Medal, and further accentuated the necessity for adjuncts and-aur- 
iliaries as part of the composition of a fleet. 
The IS87 paper had fo r  its object the complete abandonment of 
masts and sails for propulsion and the systematic organisation of 
adjuncts and auxiliaries as part  of and t o  accompany future divisions, 
squadrons, and fleets for the purpose of war. Such portions of these 
efforts as seem useful have teen embodied in this paper f o r  discussion 
today. 
The sails have gone for good and all, and only sufficient masts and 
yards remain temporarily for the purpose of ‘I fire control ” and com- 
munication by signal. It is therefore needless to dwell on that  portion 
of the 1887 suggestions. 
On the  other hand, the statement as to “ t h e  revolutionary state of 
things which is going 011 in everything connected Kith a floating fight,” 
still holds good, and has been confirmed by a recent experience in 
Eastern waters. I may therefore repeat “ t h a t  what mas good and 
proper yesterday is obsolete and condemned to-day, and mho knows 
that  tomorrow may not call into existence some new subaqueous or 
aErial machine which mill make it necessary to build ships that  mill 
float bottom upwards, or  on some other system contrary t o  tho pattern4 
in office.” 
Since the above words were written, under-water navigation has 
come to stay, aErial navigation is well above the horizon, and has 
become one of the possible weapons of future naval warfare; and in- 
ternal combustion engines are in existence and rapidly growing! 
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1446 ‘Tiit:  ORGANISATIOS OF A YOUEIIX FLEET FOIL WAIL 
I concluded the paragraph by adding: “Under these circum- 
stances, in regulating the interior economy of present and future 
divlsioas, squaarons, and fleets, we niust strive our utmost not only 
to  keep pace with the inveutious of the day and ahead of all maritimo 
Powers, but  to organise and exercse in keeping with adopted inven- 
tions, so as to be able to  use them with greater efiect than any 
maritime Power; and above all, when anptliing connected with the 
fighting capabilities, propulsion, or esercise of the units or their 
compouent parts is condemned and proved to be bad, root it out, and 
have dono with it!” 
I uoiv suggest that the time has come to substitute telescopic 
masts with wireless platforms fo r  communication without tops or yards, 
and so do away entirely with exposed abovodeclc gun fire. Thcso 
masts would be telescoped below the armour while within range, 
their wireless senders, receivers, and platforms coming down and 
being stowed away beside thcm in comparative safety. 
This decrease or abolition of ‘’ above-deck target ” would bring 
your fire control down to the highast level of the deck structure, and 
you could utilise the  weight saved by constructing a firecontrol 
armoured tower in touch with all the gum. It is courting disaster t o  
risk the demolition of your fire control early in the action; some 
system must be perfected that will give it the best chance of remaining 
effective until the adversaries’ guns have been silencedl The idea of 
an Eire1 lower structure for fire control and spotting is equally bad 
on account of exposure, and the same may be spid of utilising the boats’ 
cranes. 
The one aim and object of all spotting is to get an instantaneous 
communication from the spotter to the sight setter. It needs little 
or no demonstration to accentuate the necessity for rapidity! W a s  
the last projectile a hit1 How much over or short or to right or 
left P And how soon can the sight setter know the plunge position? 
The unfortunate predicament in which we are placed by the 
present system is tha t  it requira an elaborate bag of tricks in the 
shape of conduct wires and instruments which must be placed in the 
most probable path of the adversaries’ projectiles, and whose prin- 
cipal necessity is height above deck. 
The enormous risk of destruction a t  long range leads us t o  the 
investigation of other possible methods of obtaining the maximum 
of efficiency with the minimum risk of early destruction. The problem, 
put  shortly, resolves itself into the following questions and answers :- 
Can the sight setter get the  elevation required by his 
own observatisn a t  long range 1 
How can he best get the range quickly and ih changes 
continually 1 Answer : By having independent I‘ squad- 
ron spotteri” ahead and astern of the adversary, one 
f o r  each fleet-ship. 
The unit scout could perform this duty, keeping her parent in- 
formed by prearranged simple ball and cone signal. I n  addition, each 
ship should carry two captive balloons to observe the direction and 
as far as possible spot the elevation. These balloons would also 
carry halliards for hoisting signals. Free air-ships, when perfected, 
and capable of accurate navigation, would be most useful in spatting; 
but  by that time, if the I‘ conquest of the air ” advances a t  its present 
rate, tho l‘aater-sl~ip” will have assumed the r61e of the sparrow, 
and the “air-ship ” that  of the hawk. 
1. 
2. 
Answer: No. 
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THE O R C A N I S A ' ~ 1 0 . Y  O F  A JIOIJERS FLEET FOIL IVAIL. 1447 
I would also Euggest tha t  uo boats should be taken into action[ 
They should be hoisted out and sent t o  the various ausiliaries told 
off to look after them during action, who would hoist them on to 
positions specially fitted to receive them. 
The boat cranes should be fitted so tha t  after the boats are out 
they can be lowered into the lowest possiblo comparative safety 
position. 
I hope and believe that it will be .possible before long to do away 
with the funnels. A t  present the two iriost probable solutions ox t i e  
problcm of dispensing with tunnels seem to lay between a system of 
utilising the wasted energes of coal-to obtain power, and a system of 
propulsion without fires, substituting in the latter case explosive 
force, as already used in motor cars and boats under the name of 
internal combustion. I do not 'profess to bc able to perfect such 
erplosivo engines.for -large ships; but I have made a rough sketch 
FOS COIN0 A S E R X  FOfi CO!NC AHEAD 
Direct Action Intcmal C-,xhus!lon 
FIU. 1. 
(Fig. 1) of what I maiiitain is wnntcd, and I.make a present of the 
suggestion to any mcclianical genius who has the talent and energy to 
improve upon it and bring it to perfection. 
The effort mould be on tho same principle as the push of the oar 
or paddlewheel, o r  thrust of the screw, namely, to push water against 
water, only the action would be direct. We have long had a velocity 
of 1,700 feet a second in the war rocket by forcing air against air. 
Surely there are chemical possibilit.ies by which we may attain aa 
4 w 2  
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448 THE 0 R C A S I S A T I O . Y  OF A XODEHK FLPET FOR W l a .  
p a t ,  i f  not greater, speed by forcing dater  against water. Of ono 
hing me may be certain, and that  is, that  the funnels are quite as 
inful to-day as the sails were twenty years ago, and their removal- 
s vitally important. The absence of boilers, funnels,’ and coal would 
;reatly assist the much-needed reduction of complement in  a fleet- 
hip, both in officers and men, and it mould be another instance of the 
rony of fate i f  the present controversies on education, rank and 
iosrtion ended i n  efiacement. 
Besides tho ciiormous advantage of having your propulsion com- 
iletely below the water-line, you would be in  a position to devise 
t means by which you could render the ship .unsinkable. For instance, 
lach compartment wculd be connected by pipe and valve with the 
byhider sluicewell between the cylinder aiid the driving aperture, 
,o that the action of the thrust mould clear leaky compartments of 
vater. Just  consider for one momcnt the  space gained by some such 
,ystem, which would become available for ammunition and fuel, and 
,he reduction of internal weight caused by the absence of boilers and 
,team machinery, together with the removal of the funnels as targets 
‘or the opponents’ shot and shell. 
The steering could be accomplished by giving the cylinder and 
hiving tube a lateral motiou to the right aud left, or possibly by 
i t t ing two side propulsms at right angles to the keel. Going astern 
xould present some dificulty, but if no better way could be discovered 
you could have two smaller bow tubes, one on each bow, which 
ivould close automatically on going ahead. 
If no one is prepared to work on this suggestion, there are other 
already existing. ways by which intervalcombustion engines can be 
used for propulsion in  fleet-ships, as also i n  passenger and cargo boats, 
and surely the vast gain both for  war and commercial purpases would 
make it well worth the development of the idea by an inventive 
genius. In 1887 I was criticised by a talented officer then command- 
ing afloat for treating the turbine engine as an accepted form of 
propulsion. H e  stated in the discussion: “At  all events, it has not 
proved itself liitlierto a factor on which we can rely, and therefore 
the lecturer has drawn, to a certain extent, on what he thinks may 
be possible in the future, rather than what is possible in the present.” 
Now that  is wliat I conceive is the duty of eveiy lecturer who is asked 
to read n paper on a given subject in this theatre. Study historical 
retrospect and match closely the trend of the iwentions of home and 
foreign genius; bring the line up to date, and then endeavour to 
forecast the direction of future improvement. 
spells progress. As you cannot obtain one glimpso of the future 
except through the medium of a reflected past, study the past; then 
predict, and act on your predictions. That is the duty of those en- 
trusted with the fearful responsibility for the safety of these little 
islands and tlieir big dependencies. All I wish to predict today is, 
that  ‘I internal-combustion engines,” oil, gas, or chemical, will grow 
in size and number, and mill eventually become the motive povier for 
the purposes of commerce and war, and that  in the long run, air fleets 
will be a serious menace to “water fleets,” and may eventually r e  
place them. I mss just as certain in 1857 that the I‘ turbine ” was 
the engine of the future in large vessels for  war or trade as I am 
teday  that ‘I internal-combustion engines ” will gradually be used by 
ships of erer-increasing tonnage; that  masts and funnels must go for 
good and all; and that a’droplanes and navigable air-ships for war and 
That, to my mind,. 
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14ju THE ORGANISATIOX OF A UODERN FLEET FOR WAR. 
travelling a re  surely attaining a position which entitles them to 
serious consideration. 
In the meantime Mr. Thomas A. Edison threatens us with it 
system of control of the  wasted energies of coal, which h e  estimates 
will take a liner across t h e  Atlantic in tliree days on a tenth of t he  
present expenditure. As the funnels exist for t he  sole purpose of 
drawing tlie wasted energies and discliargiiig them into the air, it 
follows that if no energy is wasted no funnels are required. 
He also supports tlie practicability of using tlie aEriel microbe f o r  
t he  wholesale destruction of the  I f  mammoth fleet-ships,” and  proposes 
to drop a dynamite shell (Fig. 2) anywhere within a mile or two of, 
aiid so pulverise, the  hostile vessel. 
Surely the  “conquest of t h e  a i r ”  is a serious menace t o  “sea 
power,” and we may ere long be discussing the  tactics of an  air  battle! 
Fl c e t-r h i p s .  
The question of designing and  building ‘ I  fleet-ships,” and, I may 
say, tho question of their existence, has not escaped the universal con- 
troversy which eternally surrounds naval problems, and various 
solutions havo beeii suggested from time to time. Twenty years 
ago there were not  wanting officers and other esperts of high repute 
and sound jud-pent who argued, with considerable ability and  ap- 
parently on reliable rlatci, t ha t  the  days of the “ fleetrship ” were 
numbered, and tha t  swift sea-going torpedo craft were capable of 
making a clean sweep of them. 
During the interval, notwithstanding the  fact t ha t  the  under- 
water “microbe” lias continued to develop and has to be seriously 
considered, in r.ddition to  the abovewater members of its family, and 
t h e  gradual development of the air-ship, there is nothing so marked 
during the  last decade, both at home and abroad, as the steady 
growth of tonnage, speed, and gun power of the ‘ I  fleet-ship ” (mani- 
mo t.h) . 
For  example, i n  1887 I quoted t h e  I f  Dreadnought ” as tactically 
t h e  most powerful If fleet-ship ” on t h e  3Iediterranean station. Tho 
f‘ twenty years cycle,” which is estimated by home and foreign authority 
as t he  estreme limit of tlie life of a “fleetship,” has brought into 
existenco a new ‘ I  Dreadnought,” with speed that,  twenty years ago, 
would have been considered high for  n swift cruiser, and gun power 
t h a t  would sink two of her earlicr namesakes in ;I rery short space 
of time, mitli bu t  very little damage to  herself, and a feature of un- 
sinkableness which it is hoped will render her impervious to microbic 
attack ! And finally a displacement \vliicli :liould largely augment 
her capacity for carrying fuel and ammunition per inch of immersion.. 
So that, without takixg up your time with details of tlie ever- 
increasing tonnage, speed, and gun power of oiir sixty built and pro- 
posed “ fleet-ships,” I may take tlie esample quoted as fairly typical, 
and use it as evidence in  support of tlie correctness of my contention 
in 1887, where I stated:- 
“We are assured, both on home and foreign authority, t h a t  tho  
‘microbe’ is to ea t  away the ‘mammoth’ from off the  seas; but  I 
am inclined to think tha t  it will be some years yet before the  microbe 
can act without t h e  mammoth as a base. As long as you have to 
carry monster guns to attack forts and sliell arsenals, so long must you 
have monster carriages (k, fleet-ships) in which to  transport them. 
So t ha t  t h e  action of the mammoth and t he  microbe must be blended 
. 
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THE ORGANISATION OF A MODERN FLEET FOR W A X  1451 
for mutual support in the unit, division, squadron, and fleet of the  
future.” 
During the time tha t  has elapsed since the above statement was 
made there is nothing so remarkable as  the prominence that  has been 
given to ‘‘ gun power” by the naval architects and ordnance com- 
mittees of all maritime nations, together with tbe strenuous and 
laudablc efforts which have been made by all concerned in  perfecting 
the British Navy so as to insure the huge and crushing projectile 
hitting the object aimed at, even a t  the comparatively enormous ranges 
a t  which practice is now carried out. Ships may vary in the excellence 
of their target practice, but  tliero is not a shadow of a doubt tha t  
the standard of shooting has been raised in an equal if not in a 
greater ratio than the increase in gun power. 
It is this combination of power and accuracy that has robbed 
the ram of the destructive powers attributed to it, and placed the 
torpedo in the second category 0.f teapons for fleet attack and defence, 
while it has raised the gun to a position where it has a t  present no 
rival as the destructive Reapon best suited for the annihilation of the 
adversary. 
I n  my earlier offorts to deal with this question, notably in tho 
essay of 1880, it will bo seen that, while in favour of the use of 
gun power during the approach, I wns distinctly of opinion a t  that  
time that the ram held a most important, if not the first place in a 
naval battle. N y  statement was : I‘ The general princinle on which 
erery captain would fight his ship would be to try and disable his 
enemy by making the best of his artillery firo; making it very uncom- 
fortable for those who are guiding his opponent’s movements, trying 
to penetrate his vital parts, and blow un his magazine, damage 
his engines or screw, and generally speaking. to give him as little time 
for cool consideration as possible. . . .’J A t  the same time, ‘I 
added : ‘ I  Each captain must be ready for the one aim and object of 
all naval actions of the present day (1880), ‘ The fatal blow with tho 
ram!’ To avoid the enemy’s ram and run your own deep into his 
side, is the one end and aim of tactical skill, and tho best captain 1s 
he who attains that very desirable object in the shortest possiblo 
time” And I devoted four pages in  order to substantiate my con- 
tention. 
Though still convinced tha t  the ram honestly held the position 
universally accorded to it 25 years ago, I unhesitatingly declare that 
under the crushing effect of the gun as developed to-day, it has no 
longer a place in a fleet ship,” as affecting the result of R naval 
battle. The same arguments may bo advanced with reference to the 
torpedo as an offensive weapon in action, and I may say that I 
have never given the  torpedo a very prominent placc in considering 
its value in a fleet action, discharged from the “Fleet ship.” The 
only use it could be put  to would be as a means of defence, when the 
ship has become stationary, owing to disabled machinery or  screm, 
and even under such a distressing contretetnp~ I would prefer to rely 
on thc gun. 0n . the  other hand, I am far from deprecating the value 
of the torpedo as a weapon in action, discharged from swi f t  destroyers, 
organised as auxiliaries to the “ Fleet-ship.” On the contrary, 1 
have always maintained and still maintain that they are indispensible, 
especially in a night‘ action. I assert then today, and c5allengc 
contradiction, “ that  the gun and its protection and accurate discharge, 
together with a sufficient quantity of fuel.and apmunition, are t h o  
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1452 THE ORGANISATION OF A MODERN FLEET FOR WAR. 
all-important considerations for  the  success of a fleet i n  action.” 
There seems every reason t o  believe tha t  notwithstandinq the  recent 
advance, ships and guns for fleet work will still grow. As I wrote in 
1880: “If we judge of the  future by t h e  past, Khat monsters must 
pass in review before our imagination.” And I added: ‘“Qui uti  
scit ei bona ’ may well be said of guns, and  a thorough knowledge of 
how to use them in  a fleet action will be half the  battle.” Af te r  
twenty-five gears’ further experience, I would only alter the last 
phrase to  “ A l l  the battle.” The guns have grown, and the  know- 
ledge of “how to use them”  may be estimated from the  returns of 
t h e  gun layers’ and other competitions fo r  1905. 
Another point consequent on the growth of ships and guns, is 
t he  necessity for larger docks, both a t  home and foreign stations. 
Twenty thousand ton platforms to  carry guns of forty calibres and 
over, means a strain on docking accommodation, bu t  depend upon it 
tha t  the docks must and mill grow, to the ships, and from what we 
read, a move is being made in  tha t  direction. 
IMPERIAL ORGANIEATION OF THE NAVY, DISTRIBUT-ION OF 
In the 1887 paper I stated tha t  “ There is a tendency to speak of 
tho  British fleet as a whole. This is quite wrong and misleading, 
and  I for one should like to  see the  practice discontinued. . . Both 
in t h e  past and at  present we have always had numerous bodies of 
ships, sometimes called squadrons, sometimes fleets, wliich composed 
the  navy; so tha t  without proposing any  radical change, I may 
suggest that  we should have a definite number of divisions, squadroni, 
and  fleets ‘ fixed and fitted for use,’ their nomenclature depending on 
their  numerical strength i n  units. Thus a division would consist of 
three units under a rear-admiral or commodore; a squadron, six units, 
under a senior rear-admiral or vice-admiral; and a fleet, twelve units, 
under a n  admiral; each unit, division, squadron or fleet having its 
told-off adjuncts and  auxiliaries, as shown in the diagrams, and a 
distinct letter! number, or other designating sign of its own, xhich 
should be carried by all t he  component parts belonging to it.” To-day 
I am more than ever convinced tha t  t he  organisation of the  unit 
is imperative, and tha t  we must learn to  smak of fleets, squadrons, 
divisions, and p i t s ,  as indicating complete nortions of a whoIe. That  
whole being distributed on the  various stations, and in home waters 
as desirable, to meet the ever varying eccentricities of international 
complications. The general tendency, since I last endeavoured to deal 
with the  subject of Imperial organisation, has been to concentrate 
nearer home with a powerful connecting link between Channel and 
Nediterranean Fleets. List  “ A ”  gives the  proposal in 1887. List 
t‘ B ” suggests what might be the existing distribution, and the  other 
Diagrams give the composition of a unit, division, squadron, and 
fleet. (See Figs. 3, 4, and 5.) A t  the present moment we 
have sufficient ‘ I  Fleet-ships ” to form four complete fleets 
and  squadron; tha t  is, nine complete squadrons, eighteen 
complete divisions, and me shall still have t r o  spare units to 
fill up casualties. I n  1909, supposing tha t  the  present orogramme is 
carried out, we shall have five complete fleets, or, on the  assumption 
tha t  spare units are necessary? we shall .have six spare units to  take 
the  place of those sunk or disabled in our present force of four fleeta 
and a aquadron. 
FORCE, ETC. 
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1453 TRE ORCANISATION OF A MODERN FLEET €OR WAR. 
LIST 8.-1887 PROPOSAL. 
Commissioned Reserve-Tn-o Squadrons-Fleet of 
Channel Squadron . . . .  
Mediterranean Squadron and Division . ~ :, Xastless 
.. .. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
K. 
L. 
31. 
N. 
0. 
P. 
Q. 
R. 
S. 
T. 
V. 
X. 
Y. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
' D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
J. 
IC. 
L. 
K, 
0. 
3r. 
West Intlies Squadron . . 
Pacific Division . . .. 
Australian Division . . . -  
East Tndics ,, . . . .  
China Squadron Rnd Division 
S.E. Const of America Unit  
Cape and West C o s t  Division 
.. 
. .  
.. 
. .  
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
I ,  
, I  
, I  
I ,  
1 1  
I ,  
1 
First an? Second-class Cruisers. 
Armed Mcrchant Steamers. 
Obsolete for Sacrificing. 
First-clw laid-up Reserve, one to every Division a 
Bui1dir.g. 
Ramainder in Reserve. 
Imperial !l!roopsliips. 
Transports on Hire. 
Ocean Volunteer Force. 
convoy. 
.float. 
28 First and 
Second-clnss 
Ironclads or 
Cruisers ns 
niost suit- 
able. 
Coloninl Forcea. 
LIST B.-l00G PROPOSALS. 
DISTRInUTIOS OF FORCE. 
Round Const and North Sea, 3 squidrons . . 
Atlantic, 3 ,, .. .. .. .. 18 ,, 
Neditermncan Squadron and Division . . 9 ,, 
Pacific Division Cruisers . . ' . .  . . 8 Cruisem. 
11  . .  3 I t  Austnlin ,, .. . .  
I ,  .. - -  3 I ,  East Indics ,, -. 
18 Fleet units. 
Channel, 2 squadrons . . .. .. .. 12 ,, 
China Squadron Armoured Uruisers . . . , 6 Armoured Cruisors. 
Capo and W. Cozst Division Cruisers . . Cruiscrs. 
S.E. C o s t  of Amerim unit . . .. . . 1 Armoured Cruiser. 
Armoured Cruisers, patrol duty. 
Other Cruisers, patrol duty and fleet duty. 
Armed Merchant Steamers. 
ConSoy . 
Obsolete for Sacrificing, Blocking Earbours, etc. 
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’. 
?. 
t. 
I .  
.. 
J. 
J. 
i. 
f. 
h i d - u p  Reservo to replace Fleet ships nfter Destruction of Opponent’s 
Building. 
Lmnched and’coinpleting. 
Small Craft. 
Tinnsports on Hire. 
Under-water Vessels. 
Ocean Volunteer Ships. 
Fleet ships. 
Colonial Furce ? 
With reference to lists ‘ I  A ”  and “ B ” it is necessary to point 
iut t ha t  I am confining my  observations to-day to tho organisation of 
‘Fleet-ships,” bu t  such armoured cruisers as could be spared from 
notection duty, organised independently in squadrons, would require 
L somewhat siniilar arrangement for their  fuel and ammunition supply 
o tha t  proposed for ’‘ Fleetrships,” so tha t  they would be prepared to  
:o-operate with any  fleet should such co-operation become necessary. 
h i s e r s  attached to  “ Fleet-ship ” divisions would have to  be provided 
’or by tho divisional supply organisation, and there is no doubt t ha t  
,ome cruisers will have to accompany the  ‘ I  Fleekships ” to  protect 
he  auxiliaries from cruisers or destroyers, while the main action i s  
3eing decidcd. - 
COMPOSITION OF FIGIITING FLEET. 
In 1887 I stated t h a t  the  only question then was “ t h e  getting 
iogetlier of so many vessels with their guns and rams to form a fighting 
Ueet; but every day t h e  reasons for adjuncts and auxiliaries aro 
Eorcing themselves on us, and their existence renders a new and 
systematic organisation imperative. .. . .” 
I concluded the  paragraph by saying : I ‘  I propose to deal with t h e  
composition of a fleet prepared for  immediate action, and I hold t h a t  
all divisions, squadrons and fleets should be so prepared a t  all times- 
the component parts, ‘ parent; children, adjunct, and ausiliary ’-for 
opposition t o  the  hostile force, from whatever quarter it may come, 
being complete and prepared as a whole, so as to be ready for im- 
mediate muster at a given rendczvous.” 
The  
absolute necessity for having your coal or liquid fuel and ammunition 
supply under your thumb is fa r  more vital now than  it was twenty 
years ago. The importance of the  means ‘of filling up on the  spot 
after an  action with the  whole or  a portion of the  opponent’s forco 
cannot be exaggerated. Rapid recuperation is now more than  ever 
essential. 
I will recapitulate in detail what I proposed and still propose as 
indispensable in t h e  coniposition of fu ture  fleets. 
First.-I propose to  give the  term ‘‘ fleet” a definite uumerical 
value and strength which I fir a t  twelve units, adding a squadron or 
second fleet when it becomes necessary or advisable to mass an  over- 
whelming force for the  purpose of intimidation or action on a given 
spot. Taking the  available “ fleet-ships ” into consideration, and also 
the  auxiliaries, upon which me could p u t  our hand, and looking to  
facts and conditions as  they stand, I am convinced tha t  the  best 
I repeat, and beg to accentuate, the same words today. 
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TEE ORCAWISATION OF A MODERN FLEET FOR IVAE. 1455 
numerical composition for Great Britain a t  tho present time is, 
as I have repeatedly stated, in divisions of three units, two of which 
would form a squadron, joining up as many squadrons, with adjuncts 
and auxiliaries complete, as becamo necessary for the successful ful- 
filment of the required effort. Having proposed the number of units 
t ha t  should form R division, squadron, or  fleet, I will now venture to 
lyy down what I consider thcsc units (Fig. 3) should consist of :- 
A “ fleebship ” as a base, which is merely a convenient name 
for what is varionsly spoken of w a “ line-of-battle ship ” 
or “ship-of-theline.” She should be of the highest 
speed and most piercing gun power, having one or two 
telescopic signal masts for semaphore and w-ireless com- 
munication, ne t  defence, and  an  adequate number of 
protected Q.F. guns, and two captive balloons. 
Two ocean-going swift de&oyeis, commanded by trro of 
her lieutenants and manned by c rem belonging to her 
complement. 
TKO ocean-going submarines, similarly manned and com- 
manded. 
A fast turbine scout, mine remover, fitted with apparatus for 
removin mine-fields, commanded and manned as before. 
in action, and aln-ays precede her parent when entering 
and passing through channels. 
A merchant auxiliary carrying fuel, ammunition, stores, 
etc. 
A Dicision (Fig. 4).-Every three units, when joined up as a 
division, should have definitely belonging to  them, and for their sole 
use, the  following auxiliaries :- 
Two well-found and specially fitted fuel ships capablo of 
carrying a t  least 6,000 tons of fuel each, one of which 
viould always be on duty  with t h e  division, while t he  other 
is at the fuel depdt filling up, These fuel ships cannot 
be snatched up haphazard on the  spur of the moment, 
and after their shoots, hatches, and winches o r  tanks 
have passed a rigid inspection they should be told off, 
lettered o r  numbered, and their  captains given some 
insight into the  manner in which a largo force is moygd 
on t h e  open sea. 
Speaking generally, there should never be less than  
t r o  thousand tons o€ coal, o r  i ts  equivalent in liquid fuel, 
present with the force for each fleet unit. 
A large merchant steamer with high speed and great cargo 
capacity t o  act  aa general store and ammunition ship, 
carrying boom gear, cartridges and projectiles, and fitted 
with accommodation for sick and wounded. 
A torpedo and submarine depdt and telegraph construction 
ship, for laying and picking up electric cables, ctc., 
carrying half the squadron complement of fitters, spare 
torpedoes, aud electric cables. She should also be fitted 
with sick quarters and carry a medical staff. 
1. 
3. 
3. 
4. 
She wou 9 d act as lookout vessel when cniisin‘g and spotter 
5. 
1. 
3. 
3. 
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PROPOSED FLEET UNIT . 
Parent 
tfzrchent Auxi!izry 
UNIT ORGANIZATION 
FIG. 3. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 C
ali
fo
rn
ia 
Sa
nta
 B
arb
ara
] a
t 1
2:5
0 2
0 J
un
e 2
01
6 
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In 1887 I suggested a powerful tug for each division, but  I am 
now convinced that the work of towing disabled ships out of action, 
if such a feat  were possible, would be better performed by tho at- 
tendant cruisers, and 1 have therefore left the tugs out of this proposal. 
This force, with their respective scouts, destroyers, and submarines, 
would form a division under a rear-admiral or commodore. 
The Composition of a Squndron. 
The composition of a squadron (Fig. 5 )  should allow of its being 
more complete, but in the interests of perfect organisation and economy, 
if should be as nearly as possible double that  of a complete division, 
gaining a saving where dovetailing is possible.. I would tliereforo 
suggest : - 
Four fuel ships of 6,000 tons capacity, two  always with the 
squadron, having the same qualifications as before men- 
tioned. 
A large, fast spare ammunition ship, having on board a 
propoition of cartridges and projectiles of the calibre of 
each unit. She must have capacity, as owing to the 
greatly increased weight of guns and limited reserve of 
buoyancy, the ammunitioncarrying power of the “ flect- 
ship” will be severely felt in the future, and I look 
upon the spare ammunition ship or ships as next only in 
importance to the fuel ships. Take fo r  instance our 
latest launched fleet-ship, the “ Dreadnought ” and her 
class, with a combined metal and powder discharge of 
half a ton per heavy gun. Notwithstanding their dis- 
placement and carrying power, they would require am- 
munition handy after bombardment or  fleet action. 
A large fast torpedo dep6t ship of same capacity, with mines 
and spare torpedoes, carrying caissons and pontoons and. 
all gear ready fitted connected with the laying of pro- 
tective booms, and six mining launches. She would 
also carry such proportion of powder and shell as could 
not be carried in the ammunition ship. 
A large liner fitted as a hospital ship, carrying the red cross 
by day and the electric cross by night, whose special and 
only duty mould bo to take on board all badly wounded 
and serious cases, and with the assistance of her tenders 
to pick up the crews of any “ fleet-ships” that may have 
been sunk or set fire to. She would carry numerous 
steam hospital boats, and have a sea-going tender. If 
possible no sick or disabled men should ever go into 
action. 
A telegraph construction and electric cable laying ship for 
picking up, laying, and tapping cables, etc. She would 
carry in her tanks cables of all sizes required for sub- 
marine mining, utiiisiiig spare space for carrying spare 
stores t o  meet all posible requirement6 of the  squadron, 
and six mining launches. 
A depSt ship for ocean destroyers and submarines not ap- 
portioned to the units. She would also carry the ob- 
servation balloons and gas cylinders or plant for making 
gas, and akoplanes and air-ships when perfected. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
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A DIVISION 
and 0poll.r 
0' 
I P i f m i  b 
;'' 
Dlllhl.. 
Fro. 4. 
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Each of these ausiliakies would lake charge of the boats belonging 
to the fleet-ships during the action, hoisting them inboard i f  necessary. 
It will thus be seen tha t  for evcry parent or base there will be 
two destroyers, two. submarines, and one mining scout o r  lookout 
vessel and spotter, and one large merchant ausiliary. 
A Uicision.-Three units, i .c.,  G destroycrs, 6 submarines, 3 
S C ~ U ~ S ,  and 3 merchant ausiliaries, and 3 parents. 
.-1 Squatlroir.-Six units, i .e. ,  12 destroyers, 12 submarines, 6 
Scouts, and 7 merchant auxiliaries, and G parents. 
f1iztl n ‘ I  Fleet ” (Fig. G).-T\vo complete squadrons joined up, 
t d v e  units, i.e., 24 destroyers, 24 submarines, 1 2  look-out vessels, 
and 14 large merchant ausiliaries, and 12 parents. 
This force would be capable of changing i ts  locality a t  high speed. 
I n  addition to tho unit  adjuncts for defence, a torpedo 
flotilla will be required to act independently as a separate commaud. 
They \vould travel with (and assist the cruisers to defend) the 
ausiliaries from cruiser nttnck during action-one, two, or three to 
each, according to the number tha t  could be spared from the  com- 
binations of the mein attack. This composition ‘can go any length, 
and you could, if absolutely necessary, mass your five fleets complete. 
I n  3887 I concluded the  article on the  composition by saying: 
“In my opinion the  tendency in  tlie immediate future will be t o  
increase the adjuncts and decrease the  number of parents.” 
The extraordinary increase in 
gun power and accuracy of shooting has brought about a contrary 
result, and so long as the  gun maintains i t s  present overwhelming 
position, we may safely predict t h a t  the  only indispensable ausiliaries 
are : t he  fuel-ship, the  ammunition-ship. and the hospital-ship, 
together with sufficient cruisers and scouts t o  allow of an efficient 
system of look-out.. 
I was, in this case, a bad prophet. 
COYMAXD AND R E s P O ? m n I L I T s .  
Fleet organisation need not be changed. It still means the distri- 
bution of your force in tlie most compact form, marking the grades 
of command and resuonsibility a t  distinct, points. 
F o r  instance, i n  the proposed fleet, t h e  lieutenants or warrant 
officers in command of adjuncts would be resnonsible to their captain, 
who would, in his turn, be responsible fo r  tlieni and all connected 
with his unit, to t h e  divisional commodore or rear-admiral, who again 
mould be responsible to  tlie squadron vice-admiral for all  connected 
with his division, who would again be responsible to the commander- 
in-chief for his squadron. The commander-in-chief being, of course, 
responsible t o  tho Admiralty and the country for the well-being of his 
fleet. 
I ‘  I n  1887 I proposed tha t  cvery captain in co-mmand of a division 
should de fucto become a. commodore, or the rear-admirals’ list be 
largely augmented.” The latter suggestion has been adopted, and we 
have now sufficient admirals for the  five fleets, ten squadrons, or 
twenty divisions, which \roul-l require, five admirals or senior vice- 
admirals, in supreme command of fleets, five viceadmirals or senior 
rear-admirals, in command of squadrons, and ten rear-admirals or 
commodores, in command of the  remaining divisions. 
The  proposed composition of fleets, squadrons, divisions, and 
units is based on the  assumption that rccupcration (nest after gun 
. .  
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1460 TIIE ORGANISATION OF A MODERN FLEET FOR WAR. 
power and accuracy) is t h e  most important Tactor in naval warfare 
to-day. 
I wish to place a wide gulf b e h e e n  tho composition of a divinion, 
rquadron, or fleet, and its tactical formation for battle. 
COMPLETE SQUC3A3tr 
Rear Lcob out. 
0 
scout .na 6yoi:o. 
Fro. 6. 
The first should bc definitely laid down and prepared long before- 
hand, is probably now prepared. Bu t  t o  the  admiral i n  command 
must be left.the. manipulation of t he  force for which he is responsible 
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TIlE ORGANlSATIOh .  OF A 1IODEI:N FLEET FOR WAR. 1461 
to the  country. I n  1887 I stated: “We have yet to learn the most 
suitable and successful formation for attack and defence,” and  I 
advocated “perfection in all systems, and rapid changes from one 
formation to another.” 
Gun power and accuracy have again come to the rescue. The 
single line ahead has been proved and accepted by a11 to  be the  one 
possibility of a successful fleet action. Wheeling for a necessary 
change of direction, and altering course toeether when necessary, to 
take ground to the riglit, o r  left.  The siiiglo line has, in addition. to 
its effectiveness for concentration of gun fire, t he  advantage of being 
tlie most simple and easiest kept of all formations, and requires the 
minimum of signals. 
I now state without fear of contradiction tha t  there is no k n o w  
formation which tho opponent could possibly take up, that  \~-ould not 
place him a t  an  overwhelming disadvantage when pitted against the 
single line ahead. 
Therefore, it is clear t o  my mind tha t  all systems of groups, 
pairs, double columns, bow and quarter lines, and other formations, 
some of which I have advocated in days gone by, are obsolete and 
useless. And  wliy? Again, I say, owing to the  overwhelming 
supremacy of accurate lieavy gun  fire. 
AII tha t  it is now necessary to master is t he  art  of toilowing 
your leader in single lino ahead without signals, takinq ground to 
the  right or left, by order, mlien a n  increase or decrease of range 
becomes advantageous-some simple form of altering course sixteen 
points toEetlier, completes all t h a t  can be required. 
PEACE ROUTINE AND EXERCISES. 
I gave a large share of the  space in t h e  1887 paper to the 
proposal for new routines and exercises consequent on the suggested 
removal of the  yards and sails wliicli I omit to-day, as i t  is noedlass 
to tako up your time with R question which has long been included in  
the  category of decided issues. B u t  t h e  principle remains the  same. 
“ T h e  smartness, order, and also the  comfort, of energy, force, no 
matter of what it is composed, still depends almost entirely on its 
system of routine and exercises, the arranpement of which should 
insure tha t  the largest possible number are at  all times receiving the 
utmost amount of instruction and benefit from exercises t h a t  will bo 
of the greatest use to them when they have t o  assist in the  numerous 
aud different kinds of operations which the  Royal and Mercantile 
Navy will be salled upon to perform in anv war sufficiently serious 
to endange1d.m safety of the  Empire; and, a t  t he  same time, bringing 
no heavy strain on any body of men o r  portion of time. . . .” 
The nature of the  required instruction points to tho development 
of the  training class system, and  assimilatinc tlie drills, aiming, and 
target practice, etc., to t h e  home gunnery school courses. 
Lay down your routiue and drills, with a view to giving all hands 
the  best clianco of becoming S.G.T. Except ordinary educational 
subjects, nothing should be taught tha t  is not connected with the  
protection of the fleet and the  destruction of tho enemy. I n  these 
divisions and squadrons, the  criterion of smartness and efficiency will 
be the  time taken to lay a minefield, build a boom, countermine a 
channel, ou t  and in net defence, landing party complete, etc., and 
above all, tlie preparation of the  ships for battle ,in cwry  detail ; and 
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A .  COMPLETE FLEET 
No I Scout 4 md S F d t l p  
E 
0 0 
I i I 
- 
n 
b I 
0 
b 
1 
0 
I 
I 
1 
b 
1 I 
0 
FIG. 6. 
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THE OHCANISATION OF A JIODElili FLEET FON \\-An. 1463 
a system of eserciso practico instruction, which would insure t h a t  
every man who (througli casualties o r  otlier causes) may possibly 
become a “gun layer ” would prove to  be as perfect D shot as can 
be made. 
We know 
tha t  t h e  result of a flect action mill entirely deliend on tlie ammunition 
expended doing a relativo amount of damage. Tries are of no value, 
and it is only goals t ha t  count i n  this game. 
There 
is no such clear proof of tho result of practice as in “ out-and-in net 
defence.” I n  1886 fifty minutes was considercd a smart time; i n  
1906 fifty seconds is considered fairly smart. 
Tho continuous supply of cartridgcs and  projectiles in action is 
one of the  most important minor details, and  must be duplicated or 
triplicated, to make as certain as possible tliat t he  supply will bo 
equal to the  demand, and mill be forthcoming, so as t o  insure delivery 
at  the  gun, up to the  very last charge and nrojectile. 
Hydraulic or electric lifts, backed by hand gear as a last resort 
i n  t he  case of. a breakdown, mould seem t h e  most suitable method 
under present conditions. Our principal difficulty is, tha t  while power 
and accuracy of concentrated gun fire, with s ccdy recuperation, is 
t h e  one important factor tb-day, t ha t  will decile a fleet action, there 
are numerous other functions, such as the destruction of forts, mine 
fields, etc., which would t ax  tlie skill and energies of tlie officers i n  
command, and tha t  is t he  principal reason why I havc advocated, and 
still advocate, auxiliary carrying power, so as to place all requisite 
material a t  their disposal. 
F o r  the  reason already mentioned, I have omitted tho portion 
of the  former papers devoted to  sea routine, bu t  ,notwithstanding tho 
adoption of the line ahcad for action, w e  require to thoroughly 
exercise t h e  fleet in precise maimuvres, anchoring, weighing, invert- 
ing, etc., and we must still exercise the  parents, adjuncts, and 
auriliarics to move in concert and carry out  previously planned, 
combined operations. A t  least once a year, and for a neriod of not 
less t han  a month, tho whole station force, or in case of the  Atlantic, 
Home, and Reserve, tlie combined force, should muster and go to 
sea complete for war and carry out battle iiractice, one fleet against 
t h e  other. During this time the  niaiiOeuvres cannot be too real, and 
even risks must be run in  order to insure high tactical training and 
skill, and  all filling up of ammunition, fuel, and storcs should take 
place at sea. I still adhere to the  statement t ha t  tlie probability of 
the  superior officers being killed in  the  early par t  of tlie action, and 
the certainty of ships being sunk or disabled, necessitates the  estab- 
lishment of a system of filling up casualties while a t  general quarters 
(as a t  gun drill), both in ships and officers. To make it entirely 
chance work the names of t h e  ships, admirals, commodores, and 
captains, and name or rating of all commissioned officers, should be 
printed on cardboard discs, and placed in a bag on the  poop of the 
flag-ship. During combined inanceuvres, they should be constantly 
drawn, and  the ships or officers drawn, ordered off du ty  by  signal, 
the  next in command taking the  place of his superior, and i f  .ha  
should be the senior esecutiye left, becoming responsible for every- 
thing connected with the  ship. In 1887 I advocated the flagship 
changing her place 011 tho disablement of the  commander-in-chief : 
undcr prcsciit conditions no change \~ou ld  be possible-abovo all 
Practice in peace what iou  would have t o  do in  war. 
Practice is the one and only means of attaining pcrfection. 
. 
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1464 TILE OlICANLtiATLON OF A XODERN FLEE‘I‘ FOB \\-All. ’ 
things the l i nemus t  remain unbroken, t he  places of ships driven out 
being immediately filled up by the  remainder. closing up. 
For  my former statement, t ha t  “ the force should be constantly 
esercised in filling up with coal at sen,” I wish to  substitute : “ Fresh 
supplies of fuel sliould always be taken in a t  sea, and never in 
liarbour.” 
LOOK-OUT AND COXAXKINKCATIONS UNDER XEW CONDITIOXS. 
Wireless communication nieans B large estension of your system 
of look-out, and with swift cruisers and scouts commanders of divisions, 
squadrons, or fleet sliould a t  all times know, not only where their 
friends are and what they are doing, and going to do, b u t  also where 
the whole, or different parts of tlie opponents are, and what it is 
probable they are about to  do. 
W e  may fairly come to  the  conclusion that surprises, while they 
must be guarded against by a n  estended srstem of fleet look-out by 
scouts and cruisers, a re  not nearly as  likely to be as successful as  
they have been considcrcd by nearly every writer who lias attempted 
to deal with this subject. But tha t  i s  only one side of t he  necessity. 
The real aim of scouting and wireless is to find and come into contact 
with tho adversary should hc put  t o  sea. History teaches us tha t  
this has always 11cen an almost overwhelming difficulty. 
Two factors i n  the  problem liavo changed the conditions : distant 
communication, and rapid transportation of L force, quite indepen- 
dent of the mind and sea. 
It should now be much less difficult, givm tha t  t he  opponent 
pu ts  to  sea, to find him, and bring him to a decisive action. The  
development of t he  air-ship mill greatly add to the possibilities of 
obtaining accnrate information, and besides their destructive power, 
they will be invaluable as scouts. 
Rapid commissioning, though i t  sliould be instantaneous when 
necessary, is not so important, now tha t  all ships t h a t  arb in  the  
first line a re  either in commission complete, or with nucleus crews. 
Two principles seem to  nie to have been developed since I last 
had the honour of addressing an audiencp in this Institution: one; 
t he  getting rid of obsolete and  useless hulks; and tlic other, t he  
general preparedness for striking n blow, almost before the  word. 
The announcement of the declaration of war should include in 
tlio same paragraph the  news tha t  tho adversary’s main fleets havo 
been sealed up or destroyed. 
The strategical improvement in this connectioii lias linrdly yet been 
realised. 
UNIT COJIPLEMEXT. 
Taking into consideratioil the rapid growth of mechanism, and 
the  numerous uses it is  pu t  to, which will increase rather t h a n  
diminish in the  “ Fleet-ship ” of the  future;  and also the  reduction. 
of guns’ crews, notwithstanding increased gun power, it does not  
appear t ha t  the  complement of a complete uni t  need greatly 
exceed that of the  present “ Fleet-ship,” tho increase being in specialist 
officers and reliable torpedo boat coswains, gun layers, sight setters, 
et,c. Here we are  again helped by t h e  fact  t ha t  tho  general service 
officeis and men a re  gradually dying out, and the gist of t he  educa- 
ti,m scheme is, t ha t  everyone will sliecialise in  sonie form or other. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 C
ali
fo
rn
ia 
Sa
nta
 B
arb
ara
] a
t 1
2:5
0 2
0 J
un
e 2
01
6 
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Tlie unit crew sliould not greatly exceed five liuiidred all  told, , 
wit11 ten per cent. of officers for all purposes. The‘ ideal officer whs 
will keep tlie forenoon on deck, tlie first in tlle engine room, and 
visit tlie sentries between wliiles, while he drills his gun compartment 
and attends to  the  bags and bedding of liis division, will have, it, 
seems to me, just enougli to do to keep him out of mischief. When 
tlie boilers and funnels go, they will, as a natural consequence, t,ake 
a large proportion of t he  engine-room complement with them. 
Booix DEFENCE. 
Tlie enormous advance tha t  has beeii made iii the protection of 
our  home axid colonial ports by breakwaters, has, to a certain extent, 
reduced the  necessity for carrying ready-made booms; b u t  tliere a re  
still inany liarbours of refuge wlrere such a precaution would add 
greatly to the  safety of the  fleet, while taking a short rest for recupera- 
tion of figtliing efficiency, and also for tlie worn-nut officers and men. 
The boom would be carried by the auxiliaries in sections, and each 
unit of tlie force present \\-ouid assist to reere the hawsers. 
The  boom mould consist of cellular caissous or ‘pontoons, connected 
by large cellular built iiun buoys,. s1)readinc s i s  large flexible steel 
wire hawsers, interlaced witli small short steel wire, with torpedo nets, 
carried by the store ships f o r  t ha t  purpose, liuiig so as to stop sub- 
marines; tlie moorings and centre weiglit being supported by large 
buoys, betmeen one and two fatlioiiis below water. Besides defending 
the entrance t o  a harbour, tliis booni might also be laid to  bottle 11p 
the  adversary’s destroyers or submarines, wllo liar1 taken refuge in 
one of their ports, and so prevent tlieni from’ malring night raids on 
a blocliading force. 
SPEED A S  A FACTOR. 
Side by side mitli tlie increase in tonnage mid gun power lias come 
tlie increase of speed in tlie “ Fleet-ship.” 
Notwithstanding tliat the  advantage of high speed is severely 
criticised by an anonymous writer in the February number of Black- 
wood’s JIaguzinc, I place a very liigli value on the speed of tlie 
“Fleet-ship,” and for many reasons. First  and foremost, it is impor- 
tant, wliether you use it or not, to have the option under adverse 
circumstances, such as overwldming odds, etc., t o  force on, or stave 
off, an  action instead of your opponent having tliat option; and 
secondly, i n  action tactics, with superior slieed you may gain a n  
advantageous position ; with inferior speed you never will. 
II‘Iien the fleets .ire evenly riiatclied in  spced, tlie desirable T 
position will be extremely difficult to gain without dividing your 
force, bu t  it can only be  accomplislied by having relatively high speed 
as compared with the opponent. ’ 
Speed again is iiecessary, i n  the event of a portion of tlie adver- 
sary’s force declining to continuc tlie action, in order to insure fully 
attaining the object of all naval battles, namely, the complete destruc- 
tion or capture of the opponent’s ships; and lastly, speed is t he  only 
element in tlie equipmeut of a fleet which will enable you t o  find 
your antagonist, and bring liini t o  action. 
Therefore, I state unhesitatingly, t ha t  high speed in a “ Fleet- 
ship ” is all important, and especially in t h e  case of our most recent 
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addition to tlie fleet, wliere tlie guu power lias increased in a greater 
proportion than the speed. 
Wliatever tlie “ great possibilities of doing miscliief because lie 
does not uiiderstand ” (wliicli tlie Il1oel:rrood writer ascribes to the  
II’hitel~all autocrat) may consist of, i t  least we may be sure tliat, 
whoever tlie “ \\’liiteliall autocrat ” may be, lie deserves \wll of his 
country for  having iiicreased tlie speed aiid gun power of t he  ‘ I  Fieet- 
ship.” 
I will conclude this portion of my subject by summing up tlie 
requirements coiiducive to  tlie success of a “ fleet action,” gun power, 
control and accuracy of fire, protection, speed,. capacity and recupera- 
tion, no top hamper, no boats. 
Z ’ O S i t i O l l .  
An adversary is feared and respected in proportion to 
tlie awk\vard position, from your point of view, in wliicli 
he is clever enougli t o  place you. \Vellington’s high opinion 
of .Marshal Soult was based upon tlie fact t h a t  before 
going t o  bed .lie used . to  tliink over various plans whicli 
Soult might carry out during tlie night, and lie invariably found 
tha t  the Nai-slial liad adopted the one wliicli lie (Wellington) d i s  
Iliked the most! So tliat in discussing tlic pros and cons of a fleet- 
action, i t  would seem to  be t he  wisest plan to place tlie opponent 
in the  position you would least desire liini to  take up, and t h a t  is  
probably tlie position you wish to  adopt. Udoub ted ly  tlie T position 
is tlie one to  attempt above all others, bu t  i t  is improbable tliat either 
side can gain i t  with equal numbers, and yon must be funy  prepared 
for a position mhicli you have reasonable prospects of taking up. 
Therefore is is clearly tlie policy t o  build, organise, equip, and t r a in  
so as to have a decided advantage (in tlie more probable II-double I 
-position) in power, accuracy, aiid practised method of concentration. 
It is only when in possession of preponderating force t h a t  you 
could attempt an  attack from two or more directions; bu t  with t h e  
strength mliicli i t  is necessary for tlie safety of tlie Empire t h a t  we 
sliould aln-ays lia\.e at our command, you could make certain of having 
a fleet and squadron of “fleet-ships” or a fleet and squadron of 
arnioured cruisers a,oainst any  possible foreign combination on any  
given spot, and in tha t  case you could keep your fleet intact abeam 
of the  adversary,,and cross the T with your spare squadron. Wi th  
these odds (which we ought always t o  have a t  command), together 
with accuracy of gun fire, tlie annihilation of the adversary should take 
bu t  very few minutes, which accentuates Napoleon’s definition of tlie 
object of all strategy: “Rcuni r  plus de monde que l’enemie sur un 
point donne‘e.” 
Ti1 e t l  ppromh.  
The best formation in which to  cruise when you espect t o  meet 
tlie adversar is important. P o u r  scouts sliould supply you with 
his numerica T strength, formation, and course. 
It would appear t ha t  “ line abreast,” ausiliaries ten miles astern, 
would give you an  advantage, especially in thick weather. From t h a t  
position you can qyickly turn eight points together into line ahead 
when a t  your best. range, and if the opponent is approaching in line 
ahead, end ox:, you gain the T position a t  once. If you approach 
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iu liiie ahead you give tile UlJlJUUent the ckauce of nieetiug YOU with 
his line a t  right angles t o  yours, ahead of you, and so place yourself 
111 the  worst position. 
I would therefore suggest t ha t  the best formation for approach 
before opening fire is “ line abreast,” forming line ahead and down 
inasts as soon as you reach your accurate firing distance. 
Yoa would thus gain an advantage in thick‘ weather and not lose 
it. 
Concetf t f u t i o n .  
Ther9 is nothing new in the  system of concentration, either in 
land or sea battles. It is an accepted axiom, and we liave only to  
investigate the  best method of applying the prin-ciple to  a fleet 
action. In t he  event of our beiiig fortunate enough, owing t o  fog, 
mist, or rain, to  cross the  T, we should of course concentrate on the 
leading ships, and so on down the  line; bu t  in tlie more probable con- 
tingency of the adversary being in line ahead on -our beam, the  
question arises for discussion as t o  the  number of ships required to  
roncentrate on a given opponent, so t h a t  his fleet shall be destroyed 
one by one, two by two, three by three, or four by four, in the 
shortest possible time. 
The conclcsion I have orrived at  is t ha t  i t  lays between three by 
three and four by four, and i t  seems the  most natural t ha t  a division 
rhould undertake tlie destruction of its opposite number; therefore tho 
1st division shouId direct its concentrated fire on the  leader of the  op- 
ponent‘s line, then nil No. 2, and then on No. 5; the  2nd divisioii 
on No. 4, then 5 and 6 ;  the 3rd division on .the leader of the 211d 
squadron, and then on Nos. 8 and 9 ; the  4th division on No. 10, and 
then on Nos. 11 and 12 (Figs. 7 and 8). Of course, a great deal would 
depend on t h e  gun power of our fleet. A ileet of “Dreadnoughts ’I might 
concentrate two to  one on weaker opponents, so tha t  the  commander- 
in-chief would be guided by t he  known coxnparative strength of the 
opposing fleet in giving his orders for propor t io~~ate  concentration. I 
have drawn the  concentration in  the  diagram at  3 to 1, but  of course, 
as in all the points raised, i t  is open t o  your criticism and suggestions 
for improvement. 
Range. 
The question of range is of t he  greatest importance in a fleet 
action. It goes witliout saying tha t  t he  ideal range is t h a t  a t  which 
vou are sure of hitting every time, and the  one object of all tarket 
iractice should be, and is, to  augment tha t  dist-ance, and  so fa r  as 
possible to gain a most valuable tactical advantage in  t h a t  respect. 
The  jus l e  niil2ieir, where you are certain aiid the  opponent is only 
doubtful, is the range you mould naturally adopt. Fo r  tlie sake of 
esample I have used 6,000 yards, bu t  with practised and reliable 
gun-layers I should adopt their utmost limit of certainty, whatever 
t ha t  linppeiied to  be. 
Stmtryy .  
Before summing up I beg t o  submit to  tlie audience two questions 
of strategy, which, to  my mind, have long been of vital importance 
to  Great Britain, and which speciallr affect the  diitributioa of “fleet 
power ” for war and the  transport of troops to  or from the Continent 
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w 
D 
CRMOURED CRUISERS 
CC3J ,".(A 
FIG. S. 
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by other means tliaii ovcr-SBJ. 1 alliidc t o  tlie Edinburgh aiid Glasgow 
Fleet-ship Canal ; and secondly t o  the  Cliaiinel Tunnel. 
To me it seems incredible tha t  with tlie ever-iiicrcasiiig necessity 
for rapid concentration, either in the  Nortli Sea or round our  coasts, 
we liavc no  way of rapidly cutting across tlie centre! especially as tlie 
means are a t  our disposal, and would be of grcat conimcrcial valuc, 
in addition to strategical importance. The same may be said of t h e  
second question, so long aud largely discussed. Tlic advantages a re  
all on tlie side of tlie two couiitrics wliicli it would join in  an 
increasing bond of union, aiid should tlic present e n t e n t e  continue, 
which I hope and believe will be tlie case, both countries will have 
transport under-sea for mutual support. Oii the other hand, if an un- 
fortunate diBerence should arise, which I trust will uot be t h e  case, 
either country would have tlie option of closing tlie tunnel iu the  time 
i t  takes to operate tlie liaiidle of a sluice valve. 
To sum up, I would lay down tlie following rules as \-ital for tlie 
success of a fleet action :- 
1. To muster a greater iiumbcr of “fleet-ships” tbaii tlic 
adversary on asgiven spot, and t o  ensure recuperation a t  
t h a t  spot. 
By conccntration and position t o  cnsurc tlic greatest iiumber 
of projectiles hitting a given adversary in tlie shortest 
possible tinic. 
To gain the position wliere tlie adversary caii use his guns 
with the least cffcct, while you retain your full crushing 
po\~er .  
Keep your niaiu fleet intact under all circumstaiices, de- 
taching cs t ra  I‘ fleet-ships,” ai-moured cruisers, destroyers 
and submarines as necessary. 
Prepare for t h e  necessity of attacking tlie opponent broad- 
side to  broadside, crossing the  T with extra force, and 
organise a n  independent attack on tlie opposite quarter 
by destroyers and submarines on weak points; shoot 
straight, and  don’t be pu t  out by tlie concentrated fire of 
your opponent, or the sinking of a ship or two on your 
side. Use all your skill to keep your line steady. 
6. Recuperate the  moment the  action is over. Tranship 811 
wounded t h a t  cau be moved, and fill up casualties from 
ausiliarics. 
Generally speaking, think out and try to  make use of the  
latest inventions up to tlie last nioixieiit, and by training 
do your utmost t o  obviate the  necessity of making auy 
but  t h c  most simple prearranged signals after t he  masts 
come down and tlie flagship opens fire. 
In conclusion I beg to repeat t h a t  no  one can regret more than  
I do tliat me caniiot carry all we require on one keel, and to  some 
i t  may be a matter for regret t h a t  our wants cannot be carried by 
ships whose officers and men belong to the  Royal Navy; bu t  we have 
to deal with facts. Tha t  we shall have a number of component parts- 
Royal, Reserve, and T’olulitecl.-\\.orliing together under sub-heads, 
who, again, are acting under a supreme director and organiser, is a 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
7. D
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fact mliich is brouglit home to those who study the  subject. This 
means, as Sir Donald Currie pointed out  years ago in a valuable 
paper on maritime warfare, “ i’reparation long before wmted .”  It 
means t h a t  a combined and systematic organisation of our gigantic 
Royal and Nercantile naval resources is imperative, and from what we 
hear, me may assume tha t  it is making rapid progress. 
Whose all-informing mind directs the whole.” 
* “Systems in his perception roll, 
When I last wrote on this subject there were many dismal 
prophecies as t o  the deterioration of the British seainan owing t o  t h e  
loss of t h e  sails and consequent drill aloft. What  is t he  rPsultP 
. W e  have produced t.he real seaman-gunner and gun-layer. The man 
whose business in life is to load quickly and shoot straight. As is 
the  case in  all communities, the necessity of t h e  hour has produced 
the man. 
Get rid of masts, funnels, and boats, as targets courting disaater, 
and, as I said i n  1837 : “Leave only a boatchook on which to  hoist t he  
Union Jack, and  depend upon it when tlie time comes i ts  spots of 
glory will rival those of past ages, or it mill wrap itself as a shroud 
round the  ships and crews, who N ~ J  yet go down with their colours 
flying.” 
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ROUGH ESTIMATE. 
1905 BATTLESHIPS READY. 
742.000 t o n s  in 66 s h i p s  I I GREAT BRITAIN 
~FRANCE 1 
"jY 
STATES 
~ I T A L Y ~  
aM,OOO t o n s  in 28 sh ips  
188,800 t k r  in.  17 rhips 
58.700 t o n 8  In 8 rh ips  
1909 BATTLESHIPS READY. - 
[GERMANY 1 
161.600 t o n r  in 14 sh ips  
GREAT BRITAIN 
(ITALY) 
137,100 t o n r  In I I  rhipc 
846.200 t o n r  In 60 ship8 
341,600 t o n s  in 26 s h b r  
326,900 t o n r  in H Ships 
200,190 t o n r  in 08 rhipc 
180,000 tons in 13 sh ips  
n 
AUSTRIA L 65.5CO t o n s  in 11 ship6 
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ROUGH ESTIMATE. 
* D n m l  IRED .CRUISERS, 1906, READY, 
ENGLAND J 
  FRANCE 1 
E M  ANY 
E L Y  
157.W tons in 19 ships 
37.700 tons in  4 ships 
32,300 tons in 6 ships 
17.700 tons i n  2 ships 
11,600 t ons  in 2 Ships 
ARMOURED 'CRUISERS, 1909. 
ENGLAND 
I 
JUNITED STATES 1 
222,300 tons in 24 shiE 
. .  
188.500 tons i n .  15 shir 
66,200 tons In 7 ships 
60.000 tons in 7 ships 
KUSTRI A 
18,800 tons in  3 ships 
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Admiral Sir ROUERT II. HARRIS, K.C.B., K.C.X.G. :-I think before I 
say a word about tho paper, I should congratulato tho Institution on 
hr.ring, a t  last obtniiied a really valqablo naval paper. Tho only fault 
tha t  I can find with i t  is tha t  it is too exhaustive. I also think i t  
would have been greatly to . the  adrantago of .the Institution if i t  had been 
dirided into, say thrco or  four parts. Each O I ~ C  of thoso par ts  SO ably 
dealt with by our gallant lecturer would afford full scopo for a largo dis- 
cussion. To deal with tho paper paragraph by paragraph on it6 great merits 
woulcl be inipossiblo in tho courso of this slidrt half hour. Our lectures, 
a3 D rule, do not run over half-past four or five o’clock, and I fancy i t  
is four o’clock n o r .  I think I may congratulato t h e  gallant lecturer 
on his prophccies. . There is no doubt t h a t  t h e  prophecies which he mado 
twenty or thirty p a r s  ago liaro many of them becn fulfilled. I suppose 
i t  is equally rcasoiiablo t o  say tha t  somo of those lie makes now niay 
eventually bo fulfilled, though to  my mind many of tlieiii are  very strange. 
Tho balloons, for instance. 
most v-nluablc to a fleet as n spotter j but  n-hen you aro stcaming fifteen or 
twenty or twenty-three miles a n  hour, wlicro is tho balloon to be? That  
would be a puzzle t o  me. N o  doubt scieneo may orcrcomo much, but a t  
present I do not think tho uso of balloons as indicated t o  bo possible. 
Again, dealing with tho abolition of funnels and masts-and a most 
valuable suggestion i t  is-no doubt funnels and niasts ought t o  go if n-e 
can dispense with theni; but n t  present the whole t.hing turns on t h e  
internal conibustion cngiiio which tho lecturer has alluded to. Up t o  the  
prwent  I understand nobody has succeeded in getting a11 interiial conibus- 
tion engiiio to go well oCer 500-H.P. A s  our ships n o w  run up t o  30,000, 
end probably will run up to  JO,OOO-H.P., i t  will bo esceedingly difficult 
for this conlbustion engine t o  catch t h e  reciprocating engine up. It m a y  
do so. If i t  does, it’will undoubtedly be’a  great ad\-antage in  every n-ay, 
both as regards fnel and inany other points. As regards tho masts, I 
siippose wo must still liavo some place to  hoist our flags-tho adniiral’s.flag 
nnd tho Union Jack. If you p u t  them up in tho balloon, nhcn you are  
going twenty-three or tirenty-firo miles nn hour, they will be Iialf n mile 
astern or probably trailing in t h e  n-ater a t  that  pace. No doubt the  
gallant lecturer has fully realised tho value of the  submarine, and no 
doubt tho submarine has como and will stay, and i t  is on this interndl 
combustion engino t h a t  tho big, submarine depends. A t  present you 
cannot haro a very big submarine, because you cannot have R big enough 
If we really do succeed in getting a largo 
ocean-going srtbniarine she nil1 undoubtedly be a terror on tho seas. 
Probably she will not be a ~ubn~arine--slie will bc a submersible vessel, 
which, though different, is practically tho same thing. I n-ill coiifil~o 
niyself entirely to  dealing with only tho first page of the paper, and as 
there are  probably many other gentlemen n-ho would liko to speak, I will 
not trouble you any further. I would, liowcrcr, again express my regret 
t h a t  tho gallant Admiral has not giren us this very valuablo essay of his 
-1 call i t  a n  essay, really-in three or four portions, which we might 
1iai-e had the pleasure of listening to  011 three or foiir afternoons, instead 
of hnving i t  all in  one afternoon. 
I have no doubt that  a balloon would 
. iiiternnl conibustion engine. 
Vice-Adniiral W. H. HESDERSOS :-I agree wit11 Sir  Robert Harris, 
t h a t  the  paper is too cshaustive t o  a t tempt  to  criticiso tho large nun~ber  
of points raised h i  i t ,  many of nliich a re  problematical, and will depend 
on futuro de\-elopments in inrention, though some in the coiirse of nnotlier 
geiieratioii will be f a r  nil the  way toanrds solution. It. ,is a11 I~istoriral 
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principle tliat fho long-hitting weapon carrics tlic day. The club gave 
say  to tlle spear, thc spear t o  tlic IIOW, the  LOW to thc niusket, and tllc 
nlusket to tlic rifle. Wliatevcr is tho longest range weapon must aln-ays 
bo tho one for primary consi?eration. I think each fleetship must bo 
self-dcpcndeiit; t.110 moro accessories can be got rid of tho better; each 
class of vcssel must. haro frcedom to carry out  its own special functions, 
and thercforc each ship must linre i ts  ow11 sJ-steri1 of fire control. I feel 
certnin control by other vessels will never answer. I am with tho lecturcr 
in his wish t o  get rid' of ercrything t h a t  is  USCICSS, but proficiency of 
functioii must be maintained. Thc question of boats has been discussed 
over and over again. The Chinesc left theirs belrind, I , think,  i n  1891. 
Tho point must bc dccided beforehand; thcy must bc left a t  tho base or 
risked; tlicrc will be 110 tinic to  hoist them out  just before an action, nor 
could n set of ausiliarics pick them up tlien, drifting about as they 
mould bc. I heard thc  other day t h a t  an hner ican  engincer is ire11 on 
'the ivay with developments for large internal coinbustion engines ; but  
whatever clinngcs KC have, I do not concur with tho lecturer that  eiigineer- 
ing or  nieclianical skill mill be less in demand. ' All developnielits will 
require i t  of n higher order and in greater quantity. Lord Coehrane, 
I think i t  was, wlio proposed t o  destroy Croiistadt with balloons, but as 
yet we are as far off realisation as 110 was. Again, and finaIly, I do not 
think a fleet-ship can. lbok after two dcstrdyers, mucli less two submarines ; 
they niust have their o w i  separato parent-ships. \\'liatevcr thc  organiea- 
fion of 3 fleet ning be, the battle-ship must. havo nothing to  do ivith 
motliering flotilla craf t ;  she has quite enough to do her oivn n-ork and 
kccp lierself cfficicnt, coaled, watered, supplied ivith ammuxiitioi~ and all 
other necessities. They ivill not be necessarily with tho battle-fleet ; tho 
captain of a ship cannot be n-andering about to look for them, or can 
his nttcntion be given t o  children of this  sort; but this need not prevent 
flotilla craft being teniporarily attached to fleet-ships for special purposes 
when required. 
Tho CIIAIRXAS (Adniiral Sir  N. nomIeii-Smitll, I<.C$.) ;--As n o  other 
gentleniaii appears t o  n-is11 to offer any remarks, I rvill non- niorc a 
votc of tlianks to  3 i r  Clinrles Campbell for his paper, and also, on behalf 
of t h c  rnstitntion, beg to  thank tho two flag oficers who hare taken 
par t  in  the  discussion. Coniplaints aro sometimes mado t h a t  wc do not 
h a m  sufieiently up-to-date papers on nard and military niatters, but. on 
this occasion tho gallant Aclrniral has not only giren us an up-to-date 
lecture, but has trarelled fionicwhat into tho future. I do not feel coin- 
pctent, to  offer any suggestions on his proposed new methods of propulsion 
for  ocean-going ships and consequent abolition of funnels and possibly 
coal, nor can I follow him in aerial navigntion and. tho development of air- 
slrips; but in  these days we cannot look upon anything as impossible, - 
when we consider what iniinenso strides wc have niado in  our means of 
communication by the nid of wireless telegraphy, and also t h e  possibilities 
opened up by balloons or kites of increasing the  rango of our vision or 
getting a pecp iuto an onemfs harbour. Quito recently, s h e n ' o n  a 
tour in  t h e  West Indies, I mas informed tha t  Admiral Evans, of the 
United States Navy, h a d  in his cabin on board t h e  flafi-ship two photo- 
graplis of his squadron tnkcn by a camera suspended from a kite, tho  
shutter being worked electrically froni the  dcck. One photograph n-as take11 
n t  a n  eleration of 500 feet, and shomd the  squadron a t  nnchor in  Hinip- 
ton Roads. It rias rery clear, and s h o r i ~ d  distinctly the men on dcck and 
p11Ilirlg in tlic boats. Tlic other was taken a t  nn clovatiorr of 1,200 fert, 
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of the squadron under way, the  kite peing attached t o  the  atern of t h e  
flag-ship. Although, as I have previously said, I ani not able t o  follow 
the lecturer into the  future, I \\-ill offer one or two remarks on existing 
problems t o  which Iio refers. I am glad to noticc t h a t  the gallant Admiral 
espresses appreciation of tho present fitratcgical disposition of our  fleets, 
which, in m y  Iimmblo opinion, has immensely increased our strength, 
though the massing togcthcr of such n large number  of ships niay appear 
a rncnacc to  genic of t h e  other Powers. He has allnded t o  t h e  speed 
question, nnd I agrco with him tha t  i t  is of w r y  great iinportanec. You 
cannot incrcasc tlie spced of n ship after she is built, wliereas you can 
fiupplement lier,coal cnduranco by haring cruising colliers with n fleet, and 
cmling a t  sea when n-eatlier permits. 3Iaintainiirg the bunkers full is of 
such vital importance t h a t  coaling under way must be a constant exercise. 
I am nwarc tha t  two flag officers, wliasc opinion dcservedly carries great  
weiglit, iiavo recently stated t h a t  high specd docs not give t h e  tactical 
advantage usunlly ascribecl to  i t ;  but even if that  is granted, it nppears 
t o  mo tha t  in sca as well as land nnrfarc i t  is everxtliing t o  get t o  the  
right placo n t  tho right time. Tlic want of speed might involre n 
disaster or tho loss of a n  opportunity. KO o m  would, of course, wish t o  
SC‘D in a war-ship everything sacrificed t o  speed, as is t h e  caso in a scout 
ur n destroyer, b u t  I would earnestly hope t h a t  in the designs for future 
Iiattlc-ships, when nl l  tho coinpromises aro considered, tho n l u e  of speed 
will be recognised. I well reniember several years sincc the  nlnrni caused 
to some na\-al officers by the  prospectire total abolition of masts and sailq, 
and the fear esprcssed t h a t  our seaiiicii would in consequence deteriorate ; 
Lut i t  has resultccl in officers and men concentrating their nttention on 
niorc important matters, notably rapidity of coaling and improrcment in 
gunnery. It must be n gratification t o  ‘all of 11s t o  notice the  zeal 
mid attention now given throughout t h e  fleet to  target practise, which arc  
producing aucli esccllent results. I cin doubtful if tlic proposed shill 
canal between Edinburgli and Glosgon- is of suficient strategical raluc t o  
justify tho cost of construction, and ono could hardly espcct i t  t o  be a 
coniniercinl success. as i ts  length ~ ~ o u l d ,  I think, be nearly double that  of 
the AIanchcster Ship Canal. Personally I nni not in  favour of the  Channel. 
Tunnel, preferring to keep oiir “sil\-er streak ’ I  intact. I beg t o  thnnk 
the Admiral for his paper. 
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